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professional baseball teams are multiproduct firms, but that the products are weakly separable in production.  
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Analyzing  the  pricing  decisions  of  a  multiproduct  firm  presents  a  daunting  challenge  for  the 
researcher.  While this problem has received considerable theoretical attention, empirical analyses are 
scarce despite the ubiquity of the problem in practical business decisions. 
 
This  is  for  good  reason.    Several  methodological  issues  complicate  the  empirical  analysis  of 
multiproduct pricing: a large number of relevant variables, both dependent and independent; scant data 
on some of these variables; estimation difficulties; and complex theoretical relationships that cannot 
be  simplified  without  strong  assumptions.    These  formidable  obstacles  have  sharply  limited  the 
number of empirical analyses of multiproduct pricing and compromised the ease and rigor with which 
they  are  conducted.    As  a  result,  the  literature  contains  neither  a  set  of  stylized  facts  about 
multiproduct firms’ pricing behavior nor a facile methodology with which to obtain those facts. 
 
These issues all arise in the subject of our inquiry, pricing in Major League Baseball (MLB), a topic of 
longstanding  interest  in  sports  economics  and  the  quintessential  multiproduct  pricing  problem. 
Operating  in  geographically  isolated  markets,  most  baseball  teams  are  local  monopolists;  all  sell 
multiple products including tickets, parking, and concessions, at prices that vary substantially and non-
uniformly across teams and across time.  All primary factors emphasized in the theory of multiproduct 
pricing  are  potentially  relevant:  the  general  demand  for  any  team’s  “product  bundle”  fluctuates 
substantially over time, while the products sold by the team are related in demand and potentially 
subject to nonlinear pricing, such as second-degree price discrimination, in order to maximize the 
capture of consumer surplus. 
 
Yet a structural analysis of multiproduct pricing in Major League Baseball is impractical because of all 
of  the  issues identified  above.    The  required concession  quantity  or revenue data are simply  not 
available; nor are good instruments for prices.  Beyond the heuristics listed above, the theory of 
multiproduct  pricing  is  not  well  developed  for  this  straightforward  yet  non-trivial  case,  which 
combines  an  obligatory  entry  fee  (the  ticket  price)  with  complementary,  discretionary,  multiple-
purchase concessions.  Furthermore, a structural model, which explains prices in terms of many costs 
and demand elasticities, would not easily or naturally illuminate these heuristics.  Progress requires a 
methodology  that  needs  little  a  priori theoretical  structure  while  accommodating  many  prices but 
limited data on quantities, costs, and demand.  Traditional econometric techniques clearly do not 
satisfy these requirements, but there are complementary alternatives that do.   2 
One such option is a factor analytic technique, principal components analysis.  This reveals, rather 
than  imposes,  structure  in  the  data,  breaking  price  co-movements  down  into  a  few  independent 
patterns that can be interpreted heuristically and tested rigorously and simply.  With a long history of 
successful use in a variety of social and natural science applications, including several in economics 
and finance, the technique has an established track record.  And it is well suited to the analysis of 
multiproduct pricing, whose fundamental concepts are easily articulated heuristically. 
 
In this paper we utilize principal components to analyze the pricing decisions of MLB teams from 
1991-2003.  Our principal objectives are to identify the primary factors underlying pricing and to 
relate them to economic theory.  Our secondary objective is to illustrate how principal components can 
usefully facilitate the analysis of multiproduct pricing.  We find that the factors stressed by theory are 
indeed relevant in MLB.  A general demand effect explains about half of the joint variation in prices 
charged by teams, while changes in price differentials across products associated with second-degree 
price  discrimination  and  demand  complementarities  explain  another  twenty  percent,  with  price 
discrimination seemingly the more important of the two. 
 
Recognizing the novelty of using principal components in this context, we begin by describing how to 
this  method  to  analyze  multiproduct  pricing,  and  compare  it  to  structural  modeling.    Section  3 
discusses the theory and evidence on the pricing decisions of MLB teams and describes the data, while 
Section 4 presents the empirical results.  The final section provides conclusions. 
 
2.  Multiproduct Pricing: Theory and Practice 
 
A.    Structural Models 
 
A  structural  model  expresses  prices  in  terms  of  demand  parameters  and  costs,  specifying  the 
functional form using economic theory.  These models can be used to test theory, to infer the type of 
competition present in the market, or for policy analysis.  For example, Guilietti and Waterson (1997) 
use structural estimation to determine whether competitive retailers price their products as predicted 
by Bliss (1988), while DubJ (2005) uses it to infer the effects of mergers in the soft drink industry on 
prices and welfare. 
 
Each  price  markup  in  a  structural  model  depends,  in  general,  on  the  firm-level  own-  and  cross-
elasticities of demand for all products in the market. This focus on behavioral fundamentals makes   3 
these models well suited to policy analysis, but also demands a lot of data, because the number of 
parameters is sizeable even when there are just a few products and increases rapidly when there are 
more products.  Estimation thus requires extensive price and quantity data and a mechanism to account 
for price endogeneity.  Guilietti and Waterson, for example, were forced to aggregate 31 products into 
seven categories to permit estimation, and utilized industry, rather than firm, elasticities because of 
data limitations. The problem is magnified when analyzing price dynamics (DubJ et al., 2005), which 
has not yet been done using the structural approach. 
 
Structural estimation also requires a lot from theory.  The theoretical structure imposed on the analysis 
increases  and  strengthens  the  inferences  one  can  draw  from  the  data  as  long  as  the  appropriate 
functional relation can be specified in advance.  But this is often hard to do for multiproduct pricing, 
where these relations are generally complex, sensitive to model assumptions (Spence, 1980), “rather 
opaque as to intuitive content” (Sibley and Srinagesh, 1997), and “difficult to apply empirically” 
(Bliss, 1988).
2  Even when properly specified, estimation is not simple.  DubJ, for example, relies on 
numerical  techniques  (Monte  Carlo  integration  and  the  method  of  simulated  moments)  to  obtain 
parameter estimates of his model. 
 
Thus the power of structural modeling comes at a cost, which limits both the type and number of 
empirical studies that can be executed.  This motivates the introduction of an alternative method that 
can uncover relationships and answer questions structural modeling cannot, while requiring less data, 
theoretical structure, and computational effort. 
 
B.    Principal Components 
 
The  factor-analytic  perspective  treats  prices  as  governed  by  a  few  uncorrelated,  unobserved, 
underlying latent variables.  Principal components analysis can recover these latent variables and their 
relation  to  prices.    A  common  technique  for  “untangling  complex  patterns  of  association  in 
multivariate data” (Green, 1978), principal components has been used to analyze the market prices of 
                                                 
2 Mirrlees (1976) set out the complete solution for nonlinear monopoly multiproduct pricing, a complex function 
of  elasticities,  costs,  and  endogenous  Lagrange  multipliers.    Simple  relations  appear  only  under  restrictive 
conditions that exclude many realistic pricing situations such as that analyzed here.  Cost-based two-part tariffs 
are  nearly  optimal  when  goods are neither substitutes nor complements and the number of goods is large 
(Armstrong,  1999).  Two-part  tariffs  also  obtain  when  duopolists  compete  sufficiently  and  certain  other 
conditions apply (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and Stole, 2002). Optimal nonlinear prices can be 
determined separately for each market when preferences satisfy a strong condition called the “uniform ordering 
of demand curves” (Sibley and Srinagesh, 1997). Competitive retailing margins are a constant percentage across 
all goods when consumers are “fixed budget shoppers” (Bliss, 1988).   4 
shrimp (Doll and Chin, 1970), asset prices (Roll and Ross, 1980, and others), business cycles (Forni 
and  Reichlin,  1998),  industry  profitability  (Slade,  2004),  and  government  regulation  in  the  U.S. 
economy (Goff, 1986).  Here, the patterns obtained provide a heuristic description of the primary 
determinants of prices that can be linked to theory via empirical tests that can be feasibly conducted in 
a wide range of applications. 
 
One observes a sequence of prices set by a multiproduct firm on each of N goods.  The analysis 
decomposes each price vector, Pj, into a linear function of N independent latent variables, or principal 
components,  Zk,  weighted  by  scalar  coefficients  Ak:  Pj,t  =  EAk,jZt,k,  k=1..N.    These  terms  are 
determined  by  the  way  the  principal  components  are  calculated;  none  are  pre-specified.    Thus 
analytical structure is imposed on the data, as in any parametric analysis, but little theoretical structure 
is imposed. 
 
Each latent variable Zk is determined, up to an arbitrary scale factor, by demeaning the price matrix P 
and calculating the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of P
TP, placing the former in a diagonal matrix λ and 
the associated orthonormal eigenvectors in matrix A (Green, 1978; Johnson and Wichern, 1982).
3  
These matrices satisfy A
TP
TPA = λ.  The matrix of principal components Z is set equal to the matrix 
product PA; its covariance matrix is then λ. Prices are then reconstructed by P = ZA
T, as above.  While 
the number of components equals the number of prices, typically most variation is explained by a few 
components with meaningful interpretations; the others are essentially noise, or “scree.”  The sum of 
the eigenvalues equals the sum of the variances of all prices, so the fraction of joint price variation 
attributable to component k equals λkk/tr(λ). 
 
The eigenvalues and associated eigenvectors are conventionally put in descending order.  Then the 
first eigenvector contains weights, or factor loadings, that yield the linear combination of the prices in 
P with the largest variance, restricting the sum of the squared weights to equal one.  The second 
eigenvector  yields  that  linear  combination  (independent  of  the  first  eigenvector)  with  the  largest 
“remaining” variance, and so on.  If the main factors underlying price variation are those suggested by 
economic  theory,  the  first  few  eigenvectors  should  be  interpretable  as  such,  while  the  remaining 
eigenvectors should be uninterpretable and should explain little of the variation in P.  Interpretations of 
the eigenvectors can be framed as hypotheses about the associated principal component and tested in 
                                                 
3 Customarily each variable is normalized by its standard deviation, as principal components analysis can be 
sensitive to the scale of the variables.  Here this highlights the interplay of prices, the focus of the analysis.   5 
the usual way using observed independent variables X. The interpretation of component k may imply 
coefficient signs on the vector ( in the regression Zk = (X + <. 
 
Thus principal components analysis is wholly complementary to structural estimation. The inferences 
yielded  are  general,  not  detailed:  price  changes  are  explained  heuristically  in  terms  of  the  latent 
variables.    The  data  requirements  are  modest  and  computation  is  trivial.    These  features  are 
particularly  valuable  given  that  the  basic  mechanics  of  multiproduct  pricing  have  not  been 
comprehensively documented because of computational complexities and data limitations. 
 
C.    Comparison and Illustration 
 
We illustrate these points with a two-good, stylized quasi-structural model that closely echoes our 
analysis of MLB pricing.  A monopolist sets these goods’ prices based on general demand, measured 
by  a  cardinal  index  G,  and  the  variable  cost  of  producing  the  second  good,  C.    The  goods  are 
complements, so increases in C raise the price of good 2, P2, and lower the price of good 1, P1 (Forbes, 
1988): 
 
P1  =   α1 +  β1G   - γ1C 
P2  =   α2 +  β2G  + γ2C 
 
where all parameters are positive.  These can be estimated directly if G and C are measured; then the 
monopolist’s  behavior  is  fully  explained.    In  many  instances,  however,  including  our  own,  only 
imperfect  proxies  are  available.    Then  one  cannot  break  down  prices,  or  price  variation,  into 
components associated with demand or costs using structural methods. 
 
But appropriately weighted linear combinations of these prices reflect demand and costs perfectly: 
 
P1 + wP2    =   α   +  βG  
P1 + w*P2  =   α* +  γ*C 
 
If these weights (w = γ1/γ2, w*= -β1/β2) could be ascertained, perfect correlates of G and C can be 
created and then used to reconstruct prices: the monopolist’s behavior is, again, fully explained. 
 
Principal components analysis approximates these weights when the effects of G and C on prices are 
roughly independent, as illustrated in Figure 1.  The ellipse delineates, or circumscribes, the bivariate   6 
distribution of realized prices.  The effect of general demand shifts on prices is illustrated by line GG, 
with  slope  β2/β1,  and  that  of  cost  changes  is  illustrated  by  line  cc,  with  slope  -γ2/γ1.    Principal 
components  will  extract  the  exact  weights  w,  w*  if  β2γ2/β1γ1  =  1,  and  will  approximate  them 
otherwise, as the major axis, MM, containing the price combination with the greatest variance differs 
somewhat from line GG, and similarly for the minor axis, mm.
4 
 
But one need not merely speculate whether the approximation is good.  It can be checked by “auxiliary 
regressions” relating each component to observed demand and cost proxies ￿ and ￿: 
 
P1 + ºP2    =   α1  + β￿   + γ￿    +  ε 
P1 + º*P2  =   α* + β*￿ + γ*￿  +  ε* 
 
where º, º* are the weights yielded by the principal components analysis and ε, ε* are error terms. If 
these components accurately reflect the contributions of demand and costs, four testable hypotheses 
should be satisfied: β > 0, γ = 0, β* = 0, and γ* < 0.  If they are satisfied, theoretical content has been 
successfully extracted from the interactions between prices. 
 
The technique is even more valuable when one is analyzing multiple prices instead of just two, so that 
P1 and P2 represent vectors, not scalars.  One set of goods is complementary to the other set, so the 
same model applies to the prices appropriately grouped.  Principal components analysis then yields 
vectors  of  weights  º  and  º*  that  approximate  these  groupings  (which  need  not  be  specified  in 
advance).  That is, if general demand is the strongest influence on prices, the first eigenvector should 
have  positive  weights  on  all  prices,  and  the  next,  reflecting  the  influence  of  costs,  should  have 
negative weights on the prices in vector P1 and positive weights on those in P2.  The remaining 
components represent noise.  As before, the validity of these groupings can be tested using the above 
regression.  Principal component analysis is a data reduction tool as well. 
 
It  is  also  particularly  valuable  in  the  presence  of  pricing  influences  other  than  costs  or  demand, 
“institutional factors” such price restrictions or the ability to price discriminate.  Compared to other 
structural  economic  models  generally,  structural  monopoly  pricing  models  are  austere:  a  single 
decision maker utilizes a tightly defined set of relevant variables—demand parameters and costs.  Yet 
                                                 
4  Though of no consequence for this example, principal components technically weights not one price but both, 
s o   t h a t   t h e   s u m   o f   t h e   s q u a r e d   w e i g h t s   e q u a l s one.  Thus, the first component could be expressed as sin(θ)P1 + 
cos(θ)P2, where θ = arctan(β2/β1) if the “exact weights” are extracted.   7 
even here institutional factors can sometimes play a role.  These may not be easily quantified or 
formally modeled, and so can be hard to analyze or identify using structural methods.  Principal 
components can handle these factors more easily because they often can be treated, or thought of, as 
latent variables.  This property turns out to be important for our analysis, as both institutional factors 
listed above influence pricing in MLB. 
 
D.    Implementation  
 
The  major  concern  in  using  principal  components  analysis  is  the  potential  for  unjustified 
interpretations of the results.  We address this concern by analyzing a situation that is particularly 
conducive to use of the technique and by shaping the methodology accordingly. 
 
Foremost, the austerity of the monopoly pricing problem supports the use of principal components.  
Much  economic  data  represent  an  aggregate  of  multi-party,  decentralized  decision-making.  Many 
factors may generate correlations between the dependent variables, complicating and weakening the 
interpretation of the factor loadings.  This is not so here: the monopolist controls all pricing decisions, 
directly or indirectly (through contracts with concessionaires), and there are strong priors about the 
key variables that drive these decisions (demand parameters and costs) and how they influence price 
(at least heuristically).  Clearly identifiable, plausible pricing patterns in accord with these priors and 
supported by auxiliary regressions like those depicted above can reasonably be interpreted as such. 
 
Furthermore,  our  implementation  of  the  technique  is  structured  to  safeguard  against  excessive 
interpretation.  We  begin  with  a  theoretical  analysis  that  determines  whether  the  market  is  an 
appropriate application: whether prices are plausibly determined by a few underlying, independent 
factors.    Heuristics  are  produced  in  the  next  step,  the  principal  component  analysis  itself,  by 
interpreting the factor loadings.  These are not considered definitive, but rather hypotheses to be 
checked.    Initially  this  is  done  informally,  in  the  third  step,  by  conducting  principal  component 
analyses on the same prices in other markets.  Our hypotheses are suspect if the factor loadings are 
similar in markets in which the factors underlying pricing are believed to be different, or vice versa.  
Finally, formal hypothesis tests are conducted by regressing Z on X, as outlined above. 
 
3.  Major League Baseball: An Industry Case Study of Multiproduct Pricing 
   8 
A.   Studies of Pricing in Major League Baseball 
 
Major  League  Baseball  presents  a  classic  case  of  multiproduct  pricing.    The  game  “package” 
purchased by most MLB fans includes a combination of tickets, parking, food concessions, and other 
concessions  such  as  programs.  These products  are  relatively  homogenous  across firms  within the 
industry, and most ball clubs are isolated local monopolies. (The eight teams that play in the same 
metropolitan area, such as the New York Yankees and the New York Mets, have distinctly different 
fan bases—see Depken, 2000—and significant monopoly power.) 
 
For years the trade publication TMR has reported the posted prices of tickets, parking, and several 
concessions  for  the  four  major  professional  sports  leagues  in  the  United  States,  and  from  these 
calculated a Fan Cost Index (FCI) reflecting the expenses incurred by a hypothetical family of four 
that attends a game, parks at the stadium, and consumes a typical mix of concessions. For 2004, the 
MLB average FCI was $155.52, of which ticket costs, at $78.98, were barely half.  Thus expenditures 
on parking and concessions are likely to be quantitatively important.   
 
Nonetheless, a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the various prices in MLB (or any 
other sporting league) has yet to be undertaken—again, because data limitations do not allow it to be 
done using traditional methods.  Instead, previous studies focus on the relation between ticket prices 
and attendance (Depken, 2001; Marburger, 1997; Scully, 1989; and Zimbalist, 1992) or whether ticket 
prices are set optimally given the near-zero cost of seating additional fans (Ferguson, et al., 1991; 
Scully, 1989, pp. 111-113; and Zimbalist, 1992, p. 214).   
 
For single-good pricing, this would be where demand is unit elastic and revenue is maximized. Most 
studies find, instead, prices are set where ticket demand is inelastic (Krautmann and Berri, 2007).  This 
vexing outcome may be explained by accounting for other costs of attendance, which are omitted from 
most  of  these  studies,  and  their  relation  to  ticket  prices.
5   The  effect  of  ticket  price  changes  on 
attendance will be muted if concession prices move in the opposite direction, as theory suggests can 
happen and our results suggest does happen, biasing downward price elasticities estimated using ticket 
prices  alone.    Furthermore,  pricing  where  ticket  demand  is  inelastic  may  be  optimal  under these 
circumstances,  as  revenue  lost  from  ticket  price  reductions  can  be  recaptured  through  increased 
                                                 
5 Notable exceptions are Welki and Zlatoper (1994), who include the cost of parking in a study of NFL demand, 
Depken (2000) who includes average concession expenditures in a study of baseball demand, and Winfree et al. 
(2004), who proxy for the total cost of attending a game using a travel time measure.  None of these measures, 
however, completely reflect the full costs of attending a sporting event.     9 
concession demand, again as suggested by theory (Marburger, 1997; Krautmann and Berri, 2007) and 
our empirical results.  Thus our analysis can advance these strands of the sports economics literature 
while also contributing to industrial organization. 
 
B.    Multiproduct Pricing in Major League Baseball 
 
While  the  above-mentioned  features  of  MLB  make  it  suitable  for  analysis  from  an  empirical 
perspective, other features of the market make it suitable from a theoretical perspective.  In particular, 
economic theory has identified three general reasons that the prices of goods sold by a multiproduct 
monopolist would be related, and each is well represented in MLB. 
 
The first possible source of price correlations is a change in general demand for the game “package,” 
stemming perhaps from a surge in team popularity or greater income in the team’s market area.  An 
increase in general demand should exert upward price pressure for all goods in the game package, 
because each good is quite distinct and has a positive income elasticity.  Similarly, a decrease in 
demand should exert downward price pressure on all goods.  Thus the “pricing signature” of general 
demand shifts is positive co-movement of all prices, as before.  This signature is unique, and will not 
be generated by a general increase in costs, as shown below. 
 
Demand interrelations between goods also affect price setting.  Here, the most important relation is 
between  tickets  and  concessions,  which  enhance  the  game-viewing  experience.  Tickets  and 
concessions can therefore be considered two composite, complementary goods. For the two-good case, 
Forbes (1988) shows how the prices of complements respond to changes in cost or demand.  Increases 
in both products’ demands or both products’ production costs should increase both products’ prices.  
But an increase in the cost of or demand for just one of the products will increase its price and 
decrease the price of its complement. 
 
Because  the  marginal  cost  of  tickets—additional  game  attendance—is  virtually  zero,  increases  in 
factor prices should affect the cost of concessions only.  Thus cost increases will raise concession 
prices and, through Forbes’ logic, decrease ticket prices.  Similarly, idiosyncratic demand shifts for 
one of these composite goods will increase its price and lower the price of the other good.  The pricing 
signature  of  cost  or  idiosyncratic  demand  shifts  is  a  negative  relation  between  ticket  prices  and 
concession prices.  This signature is clearly distinct from that of general demand shifts. 
   10 
Finally, product prices can be related because of nonlinear pricing that attempts to maximize the 
capture of consumer surplus in the face of heterogenous consumer demand (product demand that 
differs across consumer types).  Common forms of nonlinear pricing include second-degree price 
discrimination, in which consumers can pay a fixed “entry fee” in order to purchase some range of 
quantities at a price below “list,” and the selling of bundled products at a discount.  In MLB, nonlinear 
pricing can generate price interactions across tickets and concessions because some of the surplus 
generated by lowering concession prices can be extracted in ticket prices, as exactly one ticket is 
required  of  each  patron.    The  degree  to  which  this  is  done  depends  on  the  extent  of  consumer 
heterogeneity and teams’ ability to extract surplus through ticket prices.  While all stadiums offer a 
range of seating options and ticket prices, some have a greater range than others.  Those teams are 
probably the most able to extract consumer surplus in this way, and should choose to have higher 
average ticket prices and lower concession prices in consequence, as shown in Rosen and Rosenfield’s 
(1995, p. 373) extensive theoretical analysis of ticket pricing. 
 
The interpretation of principal components in terms of the economic forces just discussed is now 
reasonably  clear.    The  eigenvector  associated  with  the  general  demand  component  should  have 
positive factor loadings on all prices, and should be correlated with demand shifters such as income 
and team winning percentage.  The eigenvector associated with cost or idiosyncratic demand shifts 
should have oppositely-signed factor loadings on tickets and concessions, as should the eigenvector 
associated with price discrimination.  Clearly, the pricing signatures of these two economic forces 
need not be distinguishable; one principal component may contain the effects of both.  If so, evidence 
on their relative importance may be gleaned from auxiliary regressions that relate this component to 
costs,  idiosyncratic  demand  shifters,  and  stadium  characteristics  that  influence  teams’  abilities  to 
extract consumer surplus through ticket pricing. 
 
C.      Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The principal components analysis is conducted on the prices of seven goods sold by all Major League 
Baseball teams from 1991-2003, as reported by TMR: tickets (average per-game season ticket prices), 
official  stadium  parking,  beer,  soda,  hotdogs,  ballcaps,  and  programs.    Beer  and  soda  prices  are 
reported for different size drinks and so are normalized to 20 ounces.  All prices are converted to 2000 
dollars  using  the  Consumer  Price  Index.    All  prices  are reported  at the beginning  of the  season; 
promotional price changes are not included in the data. 
   11 
Over this period, MLB added four teams, dramatically realigned the divisions within the American 
and National Leagues, introduced inter-league play, and expanded the post-season playoffs to include 
wild card teams.  Therefore, the price data describe relatively homogenous products across all firms 
within  an  industry  that  has  continued  to  evolve  even  while  the  individual  firms  have  remained 
relatively isolated local monopolies.  Each of these properties is conducive to testing hypotheses about 
multiproduct pricing. 
 
Table 1a presents the descriptive statistics for all prices, in the upper panel, and for those variables 
(described further below) used in the auxiliary regressions, in the lower panel. The real price of tickets 
averaged $13.95 over the sample period, whereas the average real price of parking was $7.30. Prices 
within the stadium averaged $5.18 for a 20oz beer, $2.58 for a 20oz soda, $2.27 for a hotdog, $3.56 
for a program, and $11.79 for a ball cap.  The greatest variance was displayed in ticket prices, which is 
not  surprising  given  the  different  local  market  and  stadium  characteristics  across  teams,  and  the 
smallest variance was in the prices of hotdogs and soda. 
 
Table 1b reports the correlation matrix of real prices. As can be seen, the correlation between the 
prices of any two goods in the sample is generally positive, but never greater than 0.60.  Prices are 
neither so uncorrelated that the goods can be viewed as having independent demands, nor so correlated 
that they can be treated as a single "composite good."  The positive correlations suggest that the 
dominant influence on price is the general demand for baseball, but their modest magnitudes suggest 
that multiproduct pricing considerations discussed above, which introduce negative relations between 
prices, are also possible. 
 
4.  Pricing in Major League Baseball: Empirical Results 
 
A.   Principal Component Analysis for MLB 
 
Table  2a  presents  the  basic  principal  component  analysis:  the  seven  eigenvalues  that  solve  the 
characteristic root, as well as the eigenvector and proportion of overall variation associated with each 
eigenvalue.  The  first  component  accounts  for  40%  of  the  total  variation  in  real  prices,  with  the 
subsequent three components accounting for approximately 15% each.  The others, with very small 
eigenvalues and incomprehensible eigenvectors, appear to be irrelevant scree. 
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By  carefully  examining  the  factor  loadings  in  these  first  four  eigenvectors,  the  seven  products 
represented  can  be  usefully  grouped  into  three  categories:  “obligatory  purchases”  (tickets  and 
parking), food concessions, and non-food concessions.
6  Both goods in the first category have same-
signed factor loadings in every eigenvector.  Similarly, factor loadings on the three goods in the 
second category are consistently similar in sign and magnitude, with one small exception.  In contrast, 
for  the  two  non-food  concessions,  the  signs  and  magnitudes  of  the  various  factor  loadings  are 
haphazard with respect to the other prices and each other. 
 
The heuristics uncovered by the analysis can be expressed in terms of these categories. Three patterns 
are  apparent  upon  examination  of  the  factor  loadings.  First,  the  largest  component  has  positive 
loadings on all prices, interpretable as a general demand effect, as before. This can include the secular 
trend in MLB attendance overall, interrupted by the 1994 players' strike, and intertemporal demand 
differences for individual teams as their performance varies over time.  This variation, and the change 
in demand that results, is known to be substantial.  This component suggests that its effect on prices is 
substantial as well. 
 
Second, for each of the next three components, the factor loadings of obligatory purchases and food 
concessions take opposite signs but have similar sums.  We can consider this the difference between 
the  prices  of  these  two  composite  goods,  consistent  with  the  other  pricing  influences  discussed 
previously.  This includes the interplay between complementary goods, in which idiosyncratic demand 
shifts or changes in concession costs increase the price of one good and decrease the price of the other, 
and  second-degree  price discrimination,  in  which a higher “entry  fee”  on obligatory  purchases is 
coupled with lower prices for repeat-purchase food concessions. 
 
Third, the haphazard factor loadings for the non-food concessions, along with the weak correlations 
between these prices and the other prices in Table 1b, suggest that the prices of these concessions are 
not integrated into pricing decisions for the other products.  This conclusion was buttressed, on further 
investigation,  by  the  discovery  that  the  prices  of  caps  are  regulated  by  MLB  and  by  informal 
discussions  with  a  team  official  indicating  that  programs  and  food  concessions  are  considered 
“separate markets” by the team, with prices determined separately for each. 
 
                                                 
6 Because one need not purchase stadium parking to gain access to the event, some stadiums have limited 
parking, and others have generous private parking, the “obligatory” nature of stadium parking is, of course, only 
approximate.  This grouping is indicated by the analysis, however, whatever its name.   13 
Table 2b presents results when non-food concessions are excluded from the analysis.  This distills out 
the interplay between the five remaining prices and checks the separateness of non-food concessions: 
if these are excluded, the first two patterns should appear, as before.  They do.  General demand 
explains half of the combined variation in the remaining prices, and the tradeoff between obligatory 
purchases and food concessions about 20%.  The literature suggests, variously, retaining for further 
analysis those components that are easily interpretable, that are suggested by theory, or that meet the 
“Kaiser criterion” or the “scree test.”  The first component meets all of these; the second fails only the 
Kaiser criterion, marginally; the others fail all convincingly.  We thus retain the first two components 
for further analysis, and treat the rest as noise. 
 
B.   Principal Component Analyses for Related Markets 
 
One simple way to check our interpretations is to conduct analogous principal component analyses of 
the same set of five prices in alternative markets.  The first, the National Football League (NFL), is 
quite similar to MLB, with local monopolies that experience varying product demand selling tickets, 
parking, and concessions.  The same forces that govern pricing in MLB should govern pricing here; 
thus we should expect to uncover similar factor loadings.  The second market is the national market 
for the five most closely aligned goods for which price indexes are created by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics: entertainment, parking, beer for consumption outside of the home, soda, and hotdogs.  Each 
is converted to a “real price index” by deflating with the overall CPI.  These aggregate prices, not 
specific to major league sports, should be set by competitive forces, not multiproduct pricing.  There is 
no reason to expect similar loadings here; indeed, there is no reason to expect any meaningful patterns 
at all. 
 
The results for these two markets, for the same 1991-2003 period, are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  For 
the NFL, in Table 3, both the eigenvalues and eigenvectors are very similar to those uncovered for 
MLB.  The first component, representing general demand, has positive, similar factor loadings across 
all prices, and explains 50% of overall price variation. The second component has oppositely-signed 
factor loadings on obligatory purchases and food concessions, and explains about 20% of overall price 
variation.  The other components are small and uninterpretable. 
 
In contrast, the eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the national market, in Table 4, are quite different.  
The first component, which explains 73% of price variation, includes large positive factor loadings on 
three prices, a small positive loading on a fourth, and a large negative loading on a fifth.    This has no   14 
obvious interpretation and no relationship to the economic forces outlined previously.  The second 
component does include positive factor loadings on tickets and parking and negative loadings on food 
concessions, as before, but these are dominated by an overwhelming factor loading on hot dog prices, 
while the others are near zero.  This component essentially extracts the price of hot dogs, which does 
not move in concert with the other prices.  This, too, does not relate to the economic forces outlined 
previously. In contrast, the analogous components for MLB and the NFL have substantial loadings on 
all prices, that sum to one for food concessions and negative one for obligatory purchases.  This is 
easily interpretable as the difference in the prices of these two composite goods. 
 
The analysis thus far has focused on the unexpurgated variation of real prices charged by professional 
sports teams, including both cross-team and cross-time variation. We believe this is appropriate; there 
is no reason to exclude either source of variation in advance.  However, one may legitimately wonder 
whether price changes within teams across time exhibit similar patterns.  To examine this question, we 
replicated the principal components analysis on prices that were purged of team and year effects, by 
regressing each price on a full set of team and year fixed effects and using the residuals in the analysis 
in the place of the original price data.  By culling all nationwide and fixed-team influences from 
prices, we focus the analysis on local price dynamics. 
 
In this analysis, available from the authors upon request, the principal components reveal the same 
qualitative relationships as those shown in Table 2b and Table 3. The largest influence on prices 
remained a general demand effect, which explained about 40% of the variance, and the second largest 
remained a price tradeoff between obligatory purchases and food concessions, which explained about 
20%.  Of twenty total factor loadings (2 components x 5 prices x 2 markets), nineteen were similar in 
sign and magnitude, with one being zero instead of the expected negative sign.  These results show 
that  our  original  conclusions  are  reasonably  robust  and  suggest  that  the  factors  generating  price 
variation across teams are similar to those governing local price dynamics. 
 
Finding that the principal components are similar in a similar market, different in a different market, 
and robust to the purging of team and year effects lends additional credibility to our interpretations, as 
these outcomes would be very unlikely to occur by happenstance. 
 
C.      Auxiliary Regressions 
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Finally, we test our interpretations of the two (MLB) components with economic content by relating 
them to a common set of city, team, and stadium-specific variables that should affect prices or price 
interactions.  Several of these are commonly included in other economic studies of professional sports: 
season attendance, city per-capita income, city population, once-lagged team win percentage, the age 
of the stadium and its square, and a dummy for whether the stadium is single-purpose.  We also 
construct a proxy for the local wages of amusement workers.
7  The descriptive statistics for these 
variables, reported in Table 1b, are similar to those reported in other studies.  Lagged win percentage 
and the wage variable are not available for first-year expansion teams and Canadian teams, so these 
observations are dropped. 
 
Two models are used.  Model I is sparse and direct.  Attendance is used as a measure of general 
demand, the real wage of amusement workers as a proxy for variable costs, and a dummy for having a 
single  purpose  stadium  as  an  indicator  of  the  ability  to  price  discriminate.    Second-degree  price 
discrimination should be more feasible for teams whose stadiums better permit a range of seating 
options and ticket prices, to better extract surplus from consumers.  Single-purpose stadiums, such as 
Camden Yards (Baltimore), Safeco Field (Seattle), PETCO Field (San Diego), and Ameriquest Field 
in Arlington (TX), provide a wider variety of sight lines as reflected in their greater number of ticket 
options,  and  are  thus  more  conducive  to  this  pricing  strategy.    Attendance,  which  is  possibly 
endogenous, is instrumented by the following close correlates: population, lagged income, lagged 
winning percentage, stadium age, and its square (see Coates and Humphreys, 2005, and Depken, 
2004). Model II simply replaces attendance with these instruments.  All first and second stage models 
also include a time trend, and both Model I and Model II are estimated using the random effects 
estimator, deemed appropriate vis-à-vis the fixed effects estimator or pooled OLS using Hausman 
specification tests. 
 
                                                 
7  Attendance and team quality data were obtained from MLB, city income from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, city population from the Census Bureau, and stadium characteristics from Munsey and Suppes at 
www.ballparks.com.    The  real  wage  measure  was  determined  using  the  method  pioneered  by  Coates  and 
Humphreys (2002), utilizing the Regional Economic Information System generated by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  These data provide the full number of employees in the service sector (all sub-sectors) and the full 
compensation of the amusement and entertainment sector.  RWAMUSE, a proxy for the real wage rate,  is 
measured as the total real compensation in the amusement sector divided by total service sector employment. 
There are some gaps in the city data and the data series ends in 2001 because of data limitations. Missing 
observations are imputed using city-specific interpolation/extrapolation.  As the employment sector is broader 
than  the  compensation  sector,  the  estimates  of  RWAMUSE  are  not  directly  interpretable,  but  proxy  for 
differences in variable costs across cities and time.   16 
The first component was associated with a general demand effect. The auxiliary regressions presented 
in the first two columns of Table 5 support this interpretation in two ways: by rejecting the null on 
variables that are associated with demand shifts and by accepting the null on variables that are not.  
Attendance  is  highly  significant  in  Model  I,  while  four  of  five  instruments  for  attendance  are 
significant with the expected signs in Model II.  In contrast, the single purpose stadium dummy and 
real amusement wage are insignificant.  Note, incidentally, that observed general demand shifters 
explain only about 60% of this component’s variation, so reduced form regressions alone would vastly 
understate the price variation attributable to general demand shifts. 
 
We have interpreted the second component as the difference between the prices of food concessions 
and  obligatory  purchases.    This  could  be  associated  with  the  extent  of  second-degree  price 
discrimination, negatively, as greater ability to extract surplus through ticket pricing should push down 
concession prices. Both Model I and Model II support this supposition, as the coefficient on the single 
purpose  stadium  dummy  is  significant  with  the  expected  sign.    It  could  also  be  associated  with 
variable cost increases, positively, as these should raise concession prices and lower ticket prices.  
This hypothesis is not supported; the coefficient on the real wage variable takes the “wrong” sign and 
is insignificant.  Thus, the price-discrimination explanation for this component is preferred over the 
demand-complementarities explanation. However, given the modest fit of these regressions and the 
absence of idiosyncratic demand shifters in our regressions, it is possible demand complementarities 
still influence price interactions.  Finally, general demand shifters should be unrelated to the second 
component.  This is confirmed, as the attendance variable is insignificant in Model I, while only one of 
five Model II demand proxies is significant with the expected sign. 
 
Our last set of regressions used the same models to predict the prices of programs and hats.  Based on 
the factor loadings and price correlations, we concluded that these prices were set separately from the 
other prices, as if programs and hats belonged to a separate market.  If so, these prices should not be 
closely  related  to our  key  explanatory  variables.   The  regression  results  support this  expectation.  
Other than the time trend, no coefficient is significant in any regression. 
 
From  these  findings  we  draw  three  main  conclusions.    First,  general  demand  shifts,  only  partly 
traceable to observables, generate roughly half of all price variation in the products sold at MLB 
games.  This conclusion holds whether one pools all teams for all years or focuses on within-team 
price dynamics.  Second, teams engage in price discrimination that involves a tradeoff between ticket 
and concession prices.  Multiproduct pricing considerations contribute meaningfully to price variation   17 
in this market, but are less important than general demand shifts.  Third, program and cap pricing is 
not integrated with the setting of other prices, partly because of price constraints imposed by MLB. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Structural analysis of multiproduct pricing is complicated by the challenge of linking prices to a large 
number  of  own-  and  cross-price  elasticities  and costs  using  a  theoretical  relationship that  can  be 
difficult to specify a priori.  The principal components technique, instead, extracts information directly 
from the observed interactions among prices, simultaneously reducing the complexity of the analysis 
and broadening the scope of the conclusions that can be drawn from it. 
 
In our examination of pricing in Major League Baseball, these conclusions are fundamental and yet 
new—because here, as in many other markets, the questions we address have not been previously 
explored,  for  lack  of  a  practical  way  of  doing  so.    Our  analysis  clusters  seven  goods  into  three 
categories, natural yet not obvious ex ante, whose behavior is distinct.  Price variation within and 
across  categories  can  be  explained  by  elementary  theory  and  by  institutional  factors.    While 
multiproduct pricing considerations explain a non-trivial amount of price variation in this market, 
general shifts in product demand, driven substantially but not exclusively by variation in team success, 
remain the dominant influence on price. 
 
These  conclusions  are  of  intrinsic  interest,  but  they  also  inform  the  relevant  sports  economics 
literature. We have shown that, by accounting for demand interrelationships and engaging in price 
discrimination,  teams’  pricing  methods  are  more  sophisticated  than  previously  modeled.    The 
relationship  between  ticket  and  concession  prices  implies  an  omitted  variables  bias  in  the  many 
traditional attendance studies that omit the latter, and supports previous claims that optimal ticket 
pricing need not require unitary elasticity of ticket demand. 18
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Note: The ellipse circumscribes the scatterplot of realized (P1,P2) points in the 
(hypothetical) data.  Line GG reflects the effect of changes in general demand on P1 and 
P2, as discussed in the text, and has a slope of β2/β1.  Line cc reflects the effect of 
changes in cost, and has a slope of -γ2/γ1.  Line MM, the major axis of the ellipse, reflects 
the first principal component.  Line mm, the minor axis, reflects the second component. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics
        
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RPTIX Average per-game season ticket price  13.95 4.51 8.29 39.83
RPARK Price of parking 7.30 2.85 2.93 19.19
RPBEER Price of 20oz Beer 5.18 0.92 3.19 10.57
RPSODA Price of 20oz Soda 2.58 0.53 1.41 4.70
RPDOG Price of hotdog 2.27 0.55 0.78 4.23
RPPROGRAM Price of program 3.56 1.06 0.69 7.35
RPHAT Price of ball cap 11.79 2.15 4.73 20.00
ATTEND Total season home attendance (100Ks) 22.16 7.22 9.05 44.83
LAGINC Previous year’s MSA per-capita income
($1000s)
30.49 4.49 22.47 47.14
POP MSA population (millions) 6.27 5.49 1.60 21.31
LAGWIN Previous season’s wins (fraction) 0.50 0.06 0.32 0.70
STAGE Age of team’s stadium in years 30.11 24.37 0.00 89.00
RWAMUSE Real wage of amusement workers
(arbitrary units)
1.20 0.38 0.58 2.34
SPURP Team’s stadium is single purpose (0/1) 0.61 0.48 0.00 1.00
TIME Time trend (1=1991) 6.16 3.16 1.00 11.00
Price data (reported in upper panel) describe all Major League Baseball teams from 1991 through 2003 and were
obtained from various issues of Team Marketing Report (TMR). All prices, incomes, and wages converted to
2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Attendance and team win
percentage obtained from Major League Baseball. Population and income obtained from Census Bureau.
Stadium characteristics obtained from Munsey and Suppes at www.ballparks.com. Wage data obtained from the
Regional Economic Information System of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, as described in the text.  The price
data comprise a sample of 372 observations used in the principal component analysis. Stadium, income, wage,
and population data are 342 observations for U.S. baseball teams (two Canadian teams not included).
Table 1b: Correlation Matrix of Real Ticket, Parking and Concession Prices
RPTIX RPARK RPBEER RPSODA RPDOG RPPROGRAM RPHAT
RPTIX 1.00
RPARK 0.59   1.00
RPBEER 0.45   0.33 1.00
RPSODA 0.53   0.27 0.50 1.00
RPDOG 0.45   0.17 0.48 0.52 1.00
RPPROGRAM 0.14   0.12 0.02 0.10 0.18 1.00
RPHAT  0.05  -0.02 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.15 1.00
Price data describe all Major League Baseball teams from 1991 through 2003, were obtained from various
issues of Team Marketing Report (TMR), and were converted to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.22
















RPTIX 0.49 -0.18 0.21 0.15 -0.33 -0.12 -0.73
RPARK 0.36 -0.33 0.53 0.41 0.10 -0.14 0.53
RPBEER 0.44 -0.12 -0.29 -0.04 0.80 0.21 -0.15
RPSODA 0.46 0.04 -0.26 -0.11 -0.46 0.63 0.31
RPDOG 0.43 0.20 -0.30 -0.36 -0.10 -0.70 0.24
RPPROGRAM 0.15 0.54 0.64 -0.46 0.15 0.17 -0.04
RPHAT 0.10 0.72 -0.14 0.67 0.04 -0.03 -0.02




0.40 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.04












RPTIX 0.50 -0.30 -0.32  0.03 -0.74
RPARK 0.37 -0.74   0.07  0.15  0.53
RPBEER 0.45  0.19   0.86 -0.07 -0.14
RPSODA 0.47  0.28 -0.32 -0.71  0.31
RPDOG 0.43  0.49 -0.25  0.68  0.22




0.55 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.0623












RPTIX 0.47 -0.43 -0.18  0.68 -0.31
RPARK 0.44 -0.55 -0.02 -0.39  0.59
RPBEER 0.38  0.63 -0.47  0.21  0.43
RPSODA 0.41  0.27  0.85  0.15  0.08
RPDOG 0.52  0.18 -0.15 -0.56 -0.60




0.50  0.20  0.13  0.09  0.08












RCPITIX  0.50 -0.09  0.03  0.72 -0.48
RCPIPARK  0.50 -0.13  0.22  0.16  0.81
RCPIBEER  0.49  0.10  0.56 -0.57 -0.33
RCPISODA -0.49  0.16  0.79  0.35  0.04
RCPIDOG  0.14  0.97 -0.15  0.09  0.09




 0.73  0.20  0.03  0.03  0.02
Note: Variables are real price indices, constructed as described in the text.24
Table 5: Auxiliary Regressions(coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent
Variable Þ
Component One Component Two Program Price Cap Price
Independent
Variable ß Model I  Model II Model I Model II Model I Model
II




















LAGINC ---   0.09*
(0.02)











































































   0.12*
  (0.01)




   0.12*
 (0.05)
R² 0.48 0.68  0.06 0.26  0.19  0.22 0.01  0.02
Wald (C
2
9) 655.9* 775.93* 39.65* 63.8* 120.1* 128.1* 8.3 12.2
Note: N = 342: Canadian teams and first-year expansion teams are excluded because the lagged winning percentage or real wage cannot be
measured.  A random effects estimator was applied after Hausman specification tests. The first two principal components from Table 2b are the
dependent variables, along with the real prices of programs and hats. * indicates significance at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.